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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper shows an appl icat ion of  Promot ion Tournaments to re l ig ious 
organizat ions, which is appropr iate, espec ia l ly in the case of  h ighly ranked 
inst i tu t ions such as the Cathol ic Church.  With  th is object ive, we seek to ver i f y  
the suitabi l i t y of  the use Tournaments in re l igious organizat ions, regarding the  
opt imal structure of  contracts in order to select ,  as wel l  as , to promote c ler ics. 
Two models are addressed , modif ied f rom the or ig inals, through the inc lus ion of 
psychic income, both wi th two c ler ics  wi th homogeneous sk i l ls .  F inal ly,  we 
d iscuss the advantages and l im itat ions of  the Tournaments  appl ied to re l ig ious 
organizat ions , including i ts r isks and d istort ions therein.  
 
 
Key Words:   Rel ig ious Organizat ions, Cathol ic  Church,  Tournaments .  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Al l  re l ig ious organizat ion , as any other f irm, have their  ob ject ives, among 
which are ways to att ract new conver ts.  To a tta in their  a ims, each re l igious  
organizat ion is endowed wi th a d iversity of  opt ions among several  
organizat ional strategies.  To be successfu l  in achieving these object ives wi l l  
be condit ioned, in great measure, to the sk i l ls  and performance of  those who 
are respons ible for  the leadership of  the organizat ion, regarding the 
commitment of  these persons with what has been planned.  I t  is  of  the utmost 
impor tance for the re l igious f irm that i ts  c ler ics, in their  several  h ierarchical  
levels , super iors and subor dinates, exerc ise a level of  ef for t  su i table wi th the 
resul ts expected f rom each one of  them.  
The contracts establ ished between re l ig ious organizat ions and i ts c ler ics  
(workers) may be inserted in the approach of  the pr inc ipal -agent problem. 
W ithin this context ,  the f irm would be the pr incipal and i ts c ler ics , the agents .   
Therefore, according to Zech (2001, p.328) th is  re lat ionship pr inc ipal -agent 
would not be immune to problems such as moral hazard  –  in the case of  
shirk ing  behavior on the part of  the workers  –  adverse select ion –  with hidden 
informat ion  –  and d is lodgement  of  object ives –  where the workers might exert  
an ef for t ,  but in act iv i t ies which are not  those having pr ior i t y for  the f irm.  
  The cler ics , in the lack  of  appropr iate incent ives, would rather  reduce 
their  ef for ts to a min imum, act ing in their  own benef i t .   These problems tend to 
become worse when the monitor ing costs are h igh.  Evident ly,  the more 
detai led and complete the contract between the agent and the pr incipal,  the  
nearer they wi l l  be to the opt imum relat iv i ty of  the equat ioning of  the interest  of  
both part ies involved in the contractual re lat ionship, th is means, a “ f i r s t -b es t ”  
contract .   However ,  th is contract would be condit ioned to the nonex istence of 
hidden informat ion ,  to measurabi l i t y and to the observabi l i t y of  the agent’s  
behavior ,  the absence of  r isk  or of  reduced r isk , as wel l  as the possibi l i t y of  the 
pr inc ipal  impos ing severe penal t ies  on the agent,  in the case of  the agent not  
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complying wi th the contract .   W hen this  is  not poss ib le,  the a lternat ive is to 
create a “second-best ”  contract.  
Af ter  this  introduct ion , we d iscuss in sect ion 2 , in i t ia l ly,  the 
appropr iateness of  Tournaments  for  rel ig ious organizat ions , regarding the  
select ion and promot ion of  their  c lergy.  In sect ion 3, we d iscuss the issue of  
opt imal contract  for  c ler ics , where two model,  modif ied f rom the or ig inal ,  
through the inclus ion of  non-monetary income or psychic income, both wi th two 
cler ics sk i l ls  and a homogeneous phase: a s imple model  and other  model wi th  
human capita l investment  rel ig ious . In the next topic  we d iscuss the advantages 
and l im itat ions  of  the Theory of  Tournaments, inc luding i ts r isks and  d is tor t ions  
therein. F inal ly,  the conc luding remarks  wi l l  be made.  
 
2.   Promotion Tournaments for re l igious organizat ions.   
 
Rel igious organizat ions
1
,  f rom the point  of  v iew of  the Theory of  
Rel igious Markets , which is one of  the fundamental p i l lars of  Economics of  
Rel igion, are treated as bus iness establ ishments in the market that seek to 
maximize their  ut i l i t ies  through the supply of  re l ig ious goods and services.  Hul l  
and Bold (1989) modeled churches, a c lass ical re l igious organizat ion, as f i rms 
dedicated not  only to product ion but to the propagat ion of  their  doctr ines, such 
as The Ten Commandments, therefore ,  reducing the costs of  transact ions in the 
soc iety through the applicat ion of  a system of  laws.  
The maximizat ion of  the ut i l i t y of  re l ig ious f irms is reached when,  
bes ides the number of  churchgoers , or  bel ievers,  seek for government support 
or  other  ins t i tut ional condit ions, wi th the purpose of  a l lowing them to keep or  
expand their  part ic ipat ion in the market.   In th is regard, as  f irms, i t  is  
fundamental to invest igate how re l ig ious organizat ions, keeping th is a im in 
v iew, structure labor  contracts for  their  employees, in order to create incent ive 
mechanisms to induce these employees to fur ther ef for ts ,  and for them to 
                                                     
1
 The f i rm re l ig ious ,  f rom the perspect ive  of  Economics  of  Rel ig ion ,  is  noth ing more 
than a re l ig ious o rganizat ion  that  provides  goods and re l ig ious services.  
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cooperate wi th the targets of  these f irms.  In th i s sense, i t  is  fundamental to 
understand the funct ioning of  the internal labor  market of  the re l ig ious  
organizat ions, main ly of  those  which have been successfu l in conquer ing the 
re l ig ious market.    
Here,  the case of  the Roman Cathol ic  Church  st r ikes the eye.   I t  is  a sui 
gener is  organizat ion wi th near ly two mi l lennia of  h istory,  successful ,  to such a 
point  that ,  nowadays, i t  has over one  bi l l ion bel ievers spread a l l  over the wor ld. 
And something that is  pecul iar  to i t ,  in  view of  the s ize of  the re l ig ious market i t  
holds:  i t  possesses a unique centra l leadership in the f igure of  the Roman 
Pont i f f ,  d i f ferent f rom Protestant ism, wi th thousands of  denominat ions. I t  can 
be pointed out  other  re l ig ions that have had a s imi lar  success in conquer ing the 
re l ig ious market.  Among them is Is lam, wi th a lso more than one  b i l l ion 
fol lowers, wi th a far  later date of  foundat ion than Cathol ic ism, which indicates 
that i t  captured an ident ica l amount of  fo l lowers ,  or  bel ievers,  in a shorter in  
re lat ion to the re l igious market captured by the Cathol ics . However, i t  does not  
possess a unif ied leadership and,  bes ides, i t  presents  several doctr inary 
currents, being the main ones Sunni and Shia
2
.   Among the diverse opt ions for  
the applicat ion of  the Promot ion Tournaments to rel ig iou s organizat ions, the 
Cathol ic Church appeared to us as the most  suitable for  the fo l lowing reasons.  
In the case of  the Cathol ic Church , the s ituat ion is d if ferent in re lat ion to 
other re l ig ious segments.   I t  is  true that there is space to accommodate 
re l ig ious orders wi th d if ferent ru les in i ts  midst ,  but th is only can be done with 
the endorsement of  the Holy See
3
.   Dif ferent to the case of  Protestant ism, that  
lacks a unique leadership and is  subdivided into numerous denominat ions, a 
                                                     
2
  The  Musl im ca lendar  begins wi th  the  Hi j ra  (emigrat ion) ,  o r  escape of  the p rophet  
Muhammad, in  622 dC,  to  Medina.  Stark  (2003,  p .29 -31)  develops,  in  a  condensed 
way,  the issue of  the f ragmentat ion of  Is lam in to seve ra l  sects ,  a  phenomenon that  
began to  take p lace r igh t  f rom the beginning.    
3
 Canon 361  of  the 1983 Code of  Canon Law (CCL 1983) def ines what  i s  Aposto l ic  See 
or  Holy See:   “ In  th is  Code,  the te rm Aposto l ic  See or  Holy See refers  not  on ly  to  the  
Roman Pont i f f  but  a lso to  the Secretar ia t  o f  State,  the Counci l  for  the Publ ic  Af fa i rs  o f  
the Church,  and other  ins t i tu tes of  the Roman Cur ia ,  un less i t  is  o therwise apparent  
f rom the natu re of  the  mat ter  or  the context  o f  the words ” .  
.                          
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phenomenon that cont inues occurr ing. The doctr ines formulated wi th in 
Cathol ic ism need the endorsement of  the Roman Ponti f f  to becom e admit ted by 
i ts  c ler ics and i ts fa i thfu l .  Even the d iversif icat ion of  the Cathol ic  re l ig ious 
services, as i t  happens with the or ienta l l i turg i cal r i tes , among which are the  
Maronite, Copt ic and Syr iac, d if ferent f rom the L at in r i tes, are contro l led and 
supervised by the Holy See, that regulates the funct ioning of  a l l  i ts  “branches”  
scat tered throughout the wor ld, be they of  the Lat in or the eastern r i tes. The 
d if ferent iat ion of  re l ig ious products is large wi thin the cathol ic market,  but th is  
is  a lso a “market-share ”  strategy.  The Cathol ic Church is the most successfu l 
mult inat ional f i rm in the wor ld, wi th a lmost two thousand years exper ience in 
the internat ional re l ig ious market.    
Cer ta in ly,  the well -succeeded case of  th is large re l ig ious organizat ion,  
which has survived the pass ing of  the centur ies , endowed wi th sol id internal  
support  structures for  the conquer ing and maintenance of  i ts  market-share.  
External  factors , such as the support and favor of  secular  governors,  a lso 
contr ibuted to th is,  but here we do not intend to te l l  the story of  the Cathol ic  
Church per se  under the point of  v iew of  the Theory of  the Rel ig ious Market .  
The object ive here is another one:  the invest igat ion of  the internal labor  
market of  the Cathol ic Church and i ts incent ive mechanisms, in the form of  
opt imal contracts , in  what concerns i ts h ierarchical dynamics, choice and 
promot ion of  i ts  c ler ics under  the focus of  the  Promot ion Tournaments Theory 
or Tournaments .   
And why Tournaments  and not standard labor contracts , as , for  example,  
pay by product ion?  Because the internal  market of  a large s ized re l ig ious 
organizat ion, such as the Cathol ic Church,  as wel l  as that of  l arge secular 
organizat ions ( f i rms and corporat ions),  i t  possess s ingular st ructures wi th 
spec if ic  solut ions , regarding the establ ishment of  opt imal contracts, also wi th 
spec if ic  incent ive mechanisms, wi th the a im of  st imulat ing the d i l igence of  i ts  
workers in the compl iance of  their  dut ies . I t  a lso seeks to choose the best  
candidates for  the d if ferent hierarchical levels, pr inc ipal ly for  the posi t ion  that 
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is  at the top of  the Cathol ic h ierarchy, occ upied by the Roman Pont i f f .   Here , is  
essentia l  to remember  that  one of  the main character is t ics of  the Tournaments  
is  that this mechanism seeks for the select ion of  the best candidates for  the 
vacanc ies ex is t ing in a corporat ion.  Therefore, th is is  a suf f ic ient ly essentia l  
just i f icat ion for  the applicat ion of  Tournaments  for  the choice and promotion of  
the c ler ics in the Cathol ic  Church.    
Another fact should be ment ioned that recommends the appl icat ion of  the 
promot ion tournaments to the case of  the re l ig ious organizat ions:  the ef fec ts of  
common noises over i ts  workers , (as , for  instance, the adopt ion of  government 
regulat ion measures for the re l ig ious market) ,  are h igh.  This  would imply 
another favorable advantage for the appl iance of  promot ion tournaments in  
re l ig ious organizat ions over other  forms of  remunerat ion.  
Thus, i t  is  a lso appropr iate to say that the pr inc ip les that regulate the 
remunerat ions of  the Cathol ic  c lergy, as in the case of  other large 
organizat ions, they are not l inked, d ir ect ly,  to some compet i t ive logic  bound to 
the rel ig ious market.   The h ierarchical dynamics of  the Cathol ic Church,  
including their  promot ion system, h ierarchical levels  wi th their  respect ive r ights  
and dut ies , and, above a l l ,  their  remunerat ions, do not depend merely on the 
product iv i ty of  these workers .  These facts are fundamental assumptions of  the 
Promotion Tournaments.   
For the quest ion of  es tabl ished remunerat ions in the re l ig ious market,  i t  
is  important to emphasize that they are not merely monetary remunerat ions,  
s ince there are Cathol ic c ler ics (as a lso is the case of  many protestant c ler ics  
of  dif ferent denominat ions) who do not receive any sort  of  monetary income, 
among them the pr ies ts who take a vow of  pover ty.   The remunerat ion for  th is  
k ind of  worker is  g iven, above a l l ,  i n the form of  psychic income (non-monetary 
income), as we shal l  see later.   I t  is  a type of  remunerat ion re lated to the 
recognit ion of  the publ ic,  status ,  pr iv i leges, benef i ts,  feel ings of  a  v i ta l miss ion 
accompl ished,  meaning,  ex is tent ia l purpose,  etc.     
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When the remunerat ions of  the h igher h ierarchical levels of  the Cathol ic  
c ler ics are observed, compar ing them to those of  the lower levels ,  we reach the 
conc lus ion that there ex ists a s ignif icant remunerat ion d if ferent ia l with in the 
Cathol ic Church. This d if ferent ial  cannot be merely expla ined by the 
product iv i ty of  i ts  c ler ics because, as a mat ter of  fact ,  their  level ,  in terms of  
human capita l,  is  quite homogeneous. The formation of  c ler ics in  the Cathol ic  
tra in ing schools for  pr iesthood, spread througho ut the wor ld, is  standardized 
and regulated by Canonic Law.  Therefore, the fact that a h igh -rank ing Cathol ic 
c ler ic  receives remunerat ion , even i f  not necessar i ly in  money,  much h igher 
than h is subordinate, is  not  reduced to a quest ion of  product iv i ty d i f ferent ia l.     
W ich are the fundamental features of  the Tournaments , which make this  
mechanism appropr iate for  the study of  the opt imum contracts for  workers of  a 
re l ig ious organizat ion such as the Cathol ic  Church? They are the fo l lowing:   
(a)  D istr ibut ion and the magnitude of  the remunerat ions are establ ished 
a pr ior i  and are not  re lated to the absolute performance of  the worker.  
 (b)  The receiv ing of  the remunerat ions is  re lated to an assessment of  
re lat ive performance (RPE –  re lat ive per formance evaluat ion)  
(c)  The ef for t  of  the workers in a promotion tournament is  d i rect ly 
connected to the remunerat ion d if ferent ia l.   The higher  th is is ,  the stronger wi l l  
be the ef for t  to obta in the pr ize.   
 
Regarding feature (c) ,  i t  must be pointed out  that the incent ive  system 
wi l l  be much more ef f ic ient when the par t ic ipants of  the Tournament are more  
homogeneous.   I f  there is  heterogenei ty regarding the level  of  product iv i ty of  
the workers, there might be a format ion of  co l lus ions and shirk ing  behavior that  
would dimin ish the ef f ic iency of  the incent ives.  
Keeping these cons iderat ions in mind, i t  may be argued in favor  of  the 
use of  the Tournaments, wi th the a im of  expla in ing some of  the pr opert ies of  
the internal labor market of  re l ig ious organizat ions such as the Cath ol ic  
Church. This theoret ica l model  is  a lso appropr iate, as we shal l  see, in order  to 
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expla in the remunerat ion mechanisms adopted by re l igious organizat ions wi th 
the object ive of  rewarding i ts c ler ics .  This is  ordinar i ly done through the 
promot ion of  the c ler ics to a h igher  h ierarchical order,  with i ts  respect ive 
benef i ts,  be they monetary remunerat ions or non-monetary,  where th is  reward 
is condi t ioned to the re lat ive performance of  the c ler ics,  harnessed to their  
respect ive ef for t  levels.   
The level of  payment by product ion is not a ru le in the salary struc ture of  
the internal labor  markets of  re l ig ious organizat ions, v is-à-v is  the int r ins ic 
d if f icu lt ies in measur ing the product iv i ty of  the workers of  these organizat ions, 
main ly,  those establ ished by the  State. Besides,  a lso cons ider ing factors  
involv ing moral hazard  and asymmetr ic informat ion, i t  may be conc luded that  
the Tournament model ,  wi th i ts  promot ions as a s t imulus mechanism to obta in 
the maximum performance of  the workers, is  an appropr iate theo ret ica l  
f ramework . This is  because Tournament  model  expla ins how to establ ish 
opt imal contracts , both for  the choice and promot ion of  the c ler ics  for  the 
Cathol ic Church, and other s imi lar  re l ig ious organizat ions  that possess h ighly 
h ierarchical  structures .   
Zech (2001, p.331) af f irms that Promot ion Tournaments const i tute an  
appropr iate mechanism in order to incent ivate the fu lf i l lment  of  the contracts  
establ ished between the c ler ics (or candidates) and rel ig ious organizat ions. In 
th is way,  in  order to at tend to the interests,  both of  these organiza t ions,  as  wel l  
as of  their  c ler ics,  promotion tournaments  might  be used as an a lternat ive to 
other incent ive programs, among others:  ef f ic iency  wage, sort ing  –  which seeks 
to select  only the workers committed wit h the pr ior i t ies  of  the f irm –  and 
back loading remunerat ion .   In th is last  case, according to Zech (2001, p.331),  
one of  the means to incent ivate the c ler ics  to s tr ive in their  funct ion, among 
others, would be to of fer  a sat isfac tory ret i rement plan to tho se who stand out 
or d ist inguish themselves throughout  their  re l ig ious careers.    
W ith the a im of  propos ing an opt imum incentive mechanism to the 
workers of  a f irm, in v iew of  h igh -monitor ing costs , the Tournaments Theory 
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was developed star t ing f rom the sem inal work  of  Lazear and Rosen (1981).  
Those authors inspired the model presented here , but i t  is  appl ied to the 
spec if ic  case of  re l ig ious organizat ions.  Even in the case in which there is no 
expl ic i t  object ive of  implement ing a promot ion tournament to ch oose i ts c ler ics ,  
in pract ice, th is can take p lace in many s i tuat ions, acco rding to Lazear (1998, 
p.  249).   
Regarding th is point ,  i t  is  per t inent  to point out what  was said by 
Besanko,  Dravone,  Shanley e Schaefer (2004,  p. 500)  
 
 
An important  way,  in  which  subject ive assessments  are 
used to  determine  the payment  of  employees,  is  promot ion.  In  
most  enterpr ises,  promot ion invo lves a r ise in  sa lary,  which  
means the employees have g reater  incent i ves  to  take act ion,  
which wi l l  inc rease the i r  chances of  be ing pro moted.   However,  
the cr i ter ia  for  promot ion are not  wr i t ten in  an expl ic i t  contract .   
Ins tead,  there is  a  genera l  unders tanding ,  between the  
enterpr ise and  i ts  employees,  regard ing  the type  of  act ions that  
lead to  promot ions.  
 
 
This af f irmation can be appl ied adequately to contracts involv ing c ler ics  
and re l ig ious organiza t ions s ince, in fac t,  there is no k ind  of  formal contract ,  in  
general ,  conta in ing c lear ,  predetermined phrases, spec ifying which are the 
cr i ter ia or pre-requis ites demanded for a candidate  to the pastora l min is try,  for  
example, to be promoted.  Quite the oppos ite; s ince the fact that the 
assessments are non-expl ic i t ,  th is induces the par t ic ipants in the re l igious 
Tournament to seek to perform the dut ies expected of  them, in the best way 
poss ib le.  In  the fo l lowing topic ,  we shal l  present  two models of  opt imal  
contracts  for  c ler ics.  
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3.  Opt imum contracts for the clergy  
 
Here,  a s imple Tournaments  model  wi l l  be presented, based on Lazear  
and Rosen (1981) , but s l ight ly modif ied through the inclus ion of  psychic 
income.  The object ive of  th is procedure is the modif icat ion , for  the purpose of 
th is work , that cons iders a Tournament between two c ler ics, who possess 
homogeneous sk i l ls  and abi l i t ies, to be appl ied to the case of  a re l ig ious 
organizat ion, espec ia l ly,  the Roman Cathol ic Church and re l ig ious f irms with 
s imilar  hierarchical st ructures.  Further on, we shal l  d isp lay the Câmara (2002) 
model,  which incorporates human capi ta l ,  with one st age and two cler ics , a lso 
modif ied by the inc lusion of  psychic income.  In  modif ied model ,  re l ig ious 
capi ta l  subst i tutes human capita l.    
 
3.1.  The one s tage simple model  for  two cler ics wi th homogeneous abi l i t ies .  
 
Lazear and Rosen (1981) d iv ide the prob lem of  the opt imal  worker ’s  
contract in to two parts. The model here presented is a v ers ion that cons iders  
an opt imal contract for  c ler ics.  F irs t ,  the behavior of  the c ler ic ,  who wishes to 
maximize the pr ize received, is  modeled.  Once th is b ehavior is  unders tood, we 
proceed by modeling the behavior of  the re l ig ious organizat ion, which wants to 
maximize their  prof i t  ( in the case in point ,  the number of  fai thfu l/bel ievers),  
tak ing into account the behavior of  the worker, in order to obta in an opt imum 
contract .     
Let us cons ider a re l ig ious f irm wi th two funct ional col locat ions:   
supervisor c ler ic [e.g.:  Bishop (of  the Cathol ic or  protestant churches ) ]  and 
aux i l iary c ler ic [par ish pr ies t or  pr ies t ( in  the Cathol ic Church)  or pastor ( in the 
protestant churches)] .   Two homogeneous indiv iduals, th is is ,  with ident ica l 
abi l i t ies and an ident ica l level of  re l ig ious capita l,  compete between 
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themselves. W hoever wins, wi l l  obta in the post of  supervisor,  super intendent or 
Bishop
4
,  receiving a pr ize or remunerat ion   .     
This remunerat ion assumes two d if ferent forms:  monetary income and 
non-monetary income [according to Durk in and Greeley (1991) ,  who cal l  th is 
income  ( ),  relat ive to purpose and meaning] .  This non -monetary income is 
a lso known as psychic  income according to Thurow (1978) and Zech (2001, 
p.331; 2007, p.738) ,  or ig inat ing in s tatus, pr iv i leges,  use of  t i t les and  
insignias, sat isfac t ion in p leas ing and serving God and fe l low men,  test imony of  
eternal  sa lvat ion through a fa i thfu l l y professed pr ies thood, e tc
5
.    
This is a necessary modif icat ion to Lazear and Rosen’s model for  the 
case of  opt imal contracts for  c ler ics , where we assume here that these men, as 
re l ig ious people that they are, do not com pete for  the post of  supervisor  having 
as an exc lus ive pr ior i ty the monetary remunerat ion ,  nor for  “ luxury parachutes” .   
We ment ion this  because, for  example, in some cases,  eccles iast ic  min isters  
wi l l  on ly receive a monetary salary af ter  having c l imbed several  h ierarchical  
steps, such as in some protestant denominat ions.  Therefore, the main 
object ive of  the part ic ipants in the Tournament  m ight be, not for  the receiv ing 
of  a monetary income but due to the prest ige or status  of  the post  in d ispute or  
even for exc lusively spir i tual  motives.   
In several protestant denominat ions, for  ins tance, the in it ia l  h ierarchical  
stages of  the ecc les iast ic career do not confer the workers any receiv ing of  
sa lary or monetary remunerat ion , as in the case of  the Internat ional Church of  
the Foursquare Gospel ( ICFG).  Before becoming local  pastors , the candidates 
to become pastors in th is denominat ion, normally must go through the s tages of  
deacon, worker , candidate to the ministry and, only then,  they reach the 
funct ion of  Pastor ,  even reaching the pos it ions of  Super intendent  and Nat ional  
Director .    
                                                     
4
 The or ig ina l  word in  Greek,  “b ishop”  (ep iskopos) ,  means supervisor ,  inspector .   
5
 See a lso Savych,  2005,  p .55 -63.  
12 
 
In the case of  the deacons, they have, among some of  their  funct ions,  
not only in the Internat ional Church of  the Foursquare Gospel ,  but  a lso in other 
protestant denominat ions, the duty of  ass ist ing the pastor o r local leader in  
at tending to and forwarding the demands of  the fo l lowers, receiv ing v is i tors,  
co l lec t ing of fer ings and t i th ings,  in  the d istr ibut ion of  the bread and  wine –  
when celebrat ing the Euchar ist  or  Sacrament of  the Lord’s Supper or Holy 
Communion –  among other dut ies.  The worker or ass istant gives support to the 
pastor by leading meet ings in fami ly houses, vis i t ing the s ick  and minister ing 
sermons in recent ly opened congregations or “preaching points” .   Only those 
who have majored in the Theolog ical Ins t i tute of  the Internat ional Church of  the 
Foursquare Gospel can become local pastors .  The candidates to the pastora l  
minis try are workers with at least four years exper ience and must be competent  
preachers, being able to subst i tu te the local  minis ter  in  case of  absence.  None 
of  the three previous ly mentioned pos i t ions,  that is  to say, worker , deacon and 
candidate to the ministry enta i l  the pr iv i lege  of  receiv ing salary or monetary 
remunerat ion, s ince the persons who occupy these posts , do i t  vo lun tar i ly,  
which funct ions l ike a Tournament.  Af ter  act ing for  at least two years as an 
ass istant pastor ,  the candidate can take on a local congregat ion as a pastor,  
and only then, receive a salary.  Normal ly,  th is salary is propor t ionate to the 
col lec t ion or fundrais ing in the case of  the Internat ional Church of  the  
Foursquare Gospel.  The t i t led pastor can cont inue c l imbing the h ierarchical  
pyramid, which wi l l  depend of  h is performance, and occupy the post of  
Super intendent,  who is respons ib le for  the superv is ion of  several  
congregat ions, and then cont inue unt i l  occupying one of  the  posts of  National  
Director  of  the Internat ional Church of  the Foursquare Gospel,  who are 
respons ib le for  the general s trategies for  the government of  the ICFG
6
.  
Another just i f icat ion for  the incorporat ion of  psychic income to the 
Lazear model is  that there are s i tuat ions in which i t  is  demanded,  for  example,  
as a condi t ion to enter a Cathol ic re l ig ious order , among which, an Inst i tu te of  
                                                     
6
 In format ion a t  h t tp : / / super . ab r i l . com.br /supera rqu i vo/2004/con teudo_313529s htm l  document  
consu l ted on 08/23/2010  
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Consecrated Life, in that the candidate to become a c ler ic makes a vow of  
pover ty ( together wi th the vows of  chast i t y and obedience) , g iving up or 
renouncing any monetary gain that perchance he might receive,  af ter  having 
submit ted to the re l ig ious ru les, in favor of  h is order (Canons 573, 600 and 6 68 
of  the 1983 Code of  Canon Law -  CCL 1983 ) .   In such cases, the part ic ipant of  the 
Tournament wi l l  only receive psychic income, without receiv ing monetary 
salary,  a lthough their  mater ia l  sustenance is  guaranteed by the re l ig ious order.   
Monetary income (salary)  shal l  be denominated    and non-monetary 
income (psychic income) wi l l  be cal led   .   Therefore, the pr ize of  a supervisor  
or  Bishop wi l l  be         ,  where    represents  the remunerat ion of  the 
c ler ic  who wins the promotion Tournament .   The ass is tant  wi l l  receive a pr ize of  
        ,  where              and consequently      .   Each pr ize wi l l  
on ly be received af ter  the end of  the Tournament.    
Remunerat ions are determined before the beginning of  the Tournament  
and are based on the f inal ranking  that ref lects the re lat ive performance of  the 
agents  involved in the d ispute.  In the case of  the Cathol ic Church, those 
remunerat ions are f ixed beforehand in the body of  their  c anonic law.  
The probabi l i t y of  winning the contest ,  that is  to say,  of  being promoted 
or obta in ing the post in d ispute as the pr ize,  wi l l  be re lated to the level  of  ef for t  
expended by each part ic ipant,  represented by the re l ig ious pract ice and  the 
re l ig ious service rendered by indiv idual,  besides a random shock com ponent .   
Class ifying the individuals   
 
e  ,  we have:  
 
         
         
 
Where    and    are the indiv idual products ,   e     are the levels of 
re l ig ious ef for t  of  the respect ive individuals  that indicate their  sk i l l  or  average 
product ,  previous ly chosen by the c ler ic before the event ;      and    are whi te 
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noise     (    ),   that  indicate the random factors 7  that  af fect  the product of  
each c ler ic .       
Each c ler ic wish to maximize their  expected resul ts,  in order to obta in  
the h ighest value pr ize, g iven by          .   Cons ider ing the case of  c ler ic  ,  
we have:    
 
   
  
 (   )(     )  [   (   )](     )   (  ) 
 
Where  (   ) is  the probabi l i t y of    winning the tournament and  (  ) is  
the convex funct ion re lat ive to the cost  of      e f for t ,  in other  words,  a monetary 
value assoc iated to      par t icu lar  level of  ef for t .  In the case of  c ler ics who take 
a vow of  poverty,  such as the candidates who seek to enter  some cathol ic  
re l ig ious orders or Ins t i tutes of  Consecrated Life, that value could be measured 
by the salary the candidate to the pr ies thood would not be receiv ing, when he 
is ef fect ive ly ordained and begins pract ic ing h is of f ice , due to the lost  
opportunit ies in secular l i fe ,  etc.        
The f i rst  order condi t ions for  c ler ic    are g iven by:   
 
[(     )  (     )]
  
   
 
  
   
         ( ) 
 
The f irst  order condit ions s tated above indicate, for  a maximum, that the 
spread between pr izes (where pr izes  assume a monetary and a non-monetary 
                                                     
7
 Regard ing re l ig ious o rganizat ions such as the Cathol ic  Church,  those random factors  
can be of  d iverse types or  or ig ins,  such as:  a)  re l ig ious facto rs ,  among which the  
emergence of  new compet i t ive  re l ig ions,  sec ts ,  d iv is ion  or  subdivis ion processes,  
sch ism and/or  ruptures due to  doctr inary/ theolog ica l  d ivergences;  b )  po l i t ica l ,  such as 
the in tervent ion  of  the government  in  the re l ig ious market ,  through regulat ion,  
decrees,  persecut ion,  removal  o f  re l ig ious l i ber t ies ,  a l l iances wi th  governments ,  
s ign ing of  Concordats ;  c )  soc io log ica l ,  demographica l  and economical ,  such as 
secular iz ing tendenc ies ,  among which urbanizat ion,  indust r ia l i zat ion ,  accelerated 
economic growth,   recess ion or  economic depress ion,  sc ient i f ic  and technologica l  
advances,  var ia t ions in  b i r t h  ra te,  morta l i ty  and  fer t i l i t y ,  e tc .  Rel ig ious organiza t ions,  
in  many cases,  do no t  have any type of  contro l  over  these random facto rs .  
 
 
15 
 
form), cal led a marginal benef i t  of  the exercised ef for t ,  measured in monetary 
uni ts,  t imes the change in  the probabi l i t y of    winning the d ispute due to an 
addit ional uni t  of  ef for t ,  is  equal to the marginal cost assoc iated to that ef for t  
exerc ised by  .  In  other words,  th is  means that    wil l  exerc ise that  ef for t  up to 
the point in which h is marginal return, conferred by the spread between pr izes , 
becomes equal ized to the marginal cost re lated to the ef for t  incurred in the 
d ispute.   
As an individual ,    wil l  win the contest  i f  the level of  h is product  is  h igher  
than that of  individual   ;  th is is  to say i f        .  Therefore, the probabi l i ty of    
winning wi l l  be given by:        
 
      (     )      (           )      (           )   (     ) 
 
Where   is  the d istr ibut ion funct ion of  the random var iable      .  Please 
take note that :  
 
 
  
   
 
  (     )
   
  (     ),   
 
W here     is  the dens ity funct ion.  However,  s ince indiv iduals      
 
and   are  
ident ica l ex-ante, there is a symmetr ica l Nash equi l ibr ium, where   
 
and   
choose the same level of  ef for t .  This is  because i t  is  cons idered that ,  wi th 
s imilar  individuals ,          the equat ion (1) can be wr it ten as :  
 
[(     )  (     )] ( )  
  
   
    (  )     ( ) 
                       
The equat ion above has two fundamental implicat ions.  The f irs t  is  that  
the h igher the spread between pr izes , both in  monetary as in  non-monetary 
terms, the harder wi l l  be the equi l ibr ium ef fort ,  s ince   (  )     is  monotonical l y 
16 
 
increas ing in  .  A higher e levat ion in that spread, both in  terms of  monetary,  as 
wel l  as, non-monetary remunerat ion, would induce the compet ing c ler ics to 
str ive proport ionate ly more in the tournament.   
Besides, i t  can be observed in (2) that a lower spread in monetary 
income can be compensated by higher spread in  non-monetary income and 
vice-versa.  Even i f       ,  th is is ,  spread in  monetary income is  nul l ,  when 
the candidates receive equal monetary income,  or i f            th is is ,  even i f  
the candidates do not receive any monetary income, the spread in psychic  
income might be suf f ic ient as a st imulus for  the ef for t  of  the c ler ics  
par t ic ipat ing in the prom otion tournament.   Such is the case of  cathol ic c ler ics  
who belong to Inst i tu tes of  Consecrated L ife, of  the Roman Cathol ic Church,  
who must take a vow of  pover ty ( together with those of  obedience and chast i ty)  
and do not  receive a monetary salary.   This i s  not a reason, for  a novice who 
enters an order or a Cathol ic Inst i tu te of  Consecrated L ife, for  example, not to 
seek becoming a h igh - rank ing abbot  wi th in th is organizat ion.   
In other words, when deal ing wi th promotion tournaments appl ied to 
c ler ics , the spread in monetary income might be of  l i t t le  importance or even,  
not make any d if ference at a l l  in s t imulat ing the c ler ics to the ef for t .   This is  
because, according to the ex igenc ies made to those who wish to dedicate  
themselves tota l ly to a re l ig ious l i fe,  the most s ignif icant  fac tor,  in order to 
extract  the maximum performance f rom the part ic ipants of  the tournament,  
might be the expans ion in spread of  the psychic income and not an increase in 
monetary remunerat ion,  as  i t  happens in secular  organizat ions.    
In these, the s t imulus to increase the ef for t  of  the workers may come not  
only f rom the spread of  the monetary income but a lso f rom non-monetary 
income, in forms such as prest ige, inf luence, h ierarchical  power and status  of  
the job, placed as pr izes for  the promot ion tournament, for  example. This 
indicates that,  both in  the case of  secular  organizat ions and main ly in the case 
of  re l ig ious organizat ions, the Lazear and Rosen tournament model would need 
to be only min imal ly adapted,  in order to inc lude the psychic  income as well ,  as 
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i t  is  being done here and, in th is way,  becoming c loser to s i tuat ions as the one 
being dealt  with in th is paper .   Bes ides,  i t  is  necessary to take into account 
that ,  in s i tuat ions where the c ler i c does not receive a monetary income, the 
impor tance of  inc lude the psychic income is  crucia l,  in order to sat isf y (1) and 
(2).   Otherwise,  the marginal cost exerc ise incurred in by the c ler ic  would be 
equal to zero, in which case a promot ion tournament wo uld be nonexistent .   
This spread in psychic income, as a st imulus to a harder ef for t  of  the  
c ler ics , can be exempl i f ied, in the case of  Chr is t ianity,  by a d ia logue between 
Jesus Chr is t  and the Apost le Peter.  This d ia logue is  found in the New 
Testament
8
 (Mt 19: 27-30).  Simon Peter asked the Master what would he,  
Peter,  as an indiv idual,  and the other Apost les receive for  fol lowing Chris t ,  
reveal ing that ,  in fact,  his obedience to the aposto l ic  service was not devoid of  
interest or  wi thout  concrete object ives .  This passage is pret ty i l lustrat ive and 
indicates the way in which Jesus Chr ist  sought to inspire  h is d isciples to the 
ef for t  of  conquer ing souls  for  the Kingdom of  God, keeping them motivated,  in  
spite of  the h igh cost  of  the ef for t  ar is ing f rom al l  th e restr ic t ions,  
renouncements or  persecut ions they may have to undergo.    
 
27  Then Peter answered and said to Him, "See, we 
have lef t  al l  and fo l lowed You. Therefore , what  shal l  we 
have?" 28  So Jesus said to them, "Assuredly I  say to you  
that ,  in the regenerat ion, when the Son of  Man si ts on the 
throne of  His g lory, you who have fo l lowed Me wi l l  a lso s i t  
on twelve thrones,  judging the twelve tr ibes of  
Israel.  29  And everyone who has lef t  houses or brothers or  
s isters or  father or mother or wife  or  chi ldren or lands, for  
My name's sake,  shal l  receive a hundredfo ld,  and inher it  
                                                     
8
 Brams (1982) was a p ioneer in  the appl icat ion of  the Game Theory for  the analys is  o f  
the Hebrew Bib le ,  which  is  the  Old Testament  o f  the Chr is t ian Bib le .   In  th is  case,  the 
s i tuat ion analyzed  is  in  the New Testament .    
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eternal  l i fe .  30  But  many who are f irst  wi l l  be last ,  and the 
last  f i rst .  
 
 
 Peter ’s re l ig ious choice, when becoming a d isc ip le of  Chr is t ,  
character ized in th is  passage of  the scr iptures,  had a the leological
9
  basis , that  
is  to say,  i t  sought for  a def in i t ive a im:  to maximize h is ut i l i ty.   I t  was a 
rat ional choice in the economic sense of  the term.  I t  was not a re l igious choice 
in the eminent ly webber ian sense of  the word,  guided by values
1 0
.   Chr is t  
makes a point of  ca l l ing attent ion to the perspect ive of  the Kingdom of  Heaven:   
the maximizing of  the ut i l i t y intended by Peter,  at present,  would have to be 
postponed.  F irs t ,  i t  would be necessary to cope wi th the cost  of  th e investment  
in the Kingdom of  Heaven, at that moment in t ime.  Later ,  in the future,  
maximizat ion of  the ut i l i t y through eternal l i fe would be poss ib le, inc luding the 
pr ivi lege of  being co- regent together with Chr is t ,  s i t t ing on thrones.  Chr ist  
ind icates that Peter should not th ink  in an immediate return but,  to be content,  
dur ing h is l i fe  on earth, wi th the maximizat ion of  a future expected return .   
Under the perspect ive of  the concept  of  compensators,  as  def ined  in the 
Rat ional  Choice (Stark  and  Bainbr idge, 1996,  p.36) , i t  m ight  be said that Jesus 
Chr is t ,  instead of  the immediate reward sought by Peter,  of fered h im a 
compensator .   Ecc lesiast ica l h istory te l ls  us  that,  in spite of  having denied h is  
Master at the moment of  h is tr ial ,  Peter accepted the com pensator instead of  
the immediate reward he wished for and performed, as a leader , an excel lent  
work  for  the Church, even being cruc if ied because of  h is fa i th. On the other  
hand, another of  Jesus´s d isc ip les, Judas, betrayed Chr ist ,  rejec t ing the 
                                                     
9
 Relat i ve to  the  f ina l  causes .  
1 0
 Mar iano  (2008,  p .44)  c i te  Stephen Sharot´s  a f f i rmat ion,  who cons iders  that  the  
concept  o f  ra t ional i t y proposed by Rod ney Sta rk ,  based upon the Theory of  Rat ional  
Choice,  has to  do wi th  types o f  act ion re la ted to  a ims,  o f  an  economic se ignorage,  
which means that  an agent  maximizes h is  ga ins wi th  dete rminate object i ves.  Accord ing 
to  Sharot´s  in te rpretat ion,  th is  type of  ra t ional i ty,  gu ided by a ims,  would be the 
oppos i te  to  the webber ian re l ig ious rat ional i ty ,  or ientated by va lues.    
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compensator of fered by h is Master,  preferr ing an immediate reward:  30 s i lver  
coins.  
Therefore, we can perceive that the demands, quite r ig id and severe, in  
re lat ion to the aposto l ic  service, made by Chr is t ,  which could include 
abandoning family and proper t ies and , even martyrdom, were counterba lanced 
wi th a h igh level promises. That ,  when fu l f i l led,  would compensate  ef for ts  and 
restr ic t ions to which the Apost les would submit themselves in order to 
accompl ish their  mission. Chr ist  did not promise mater ia l r iches or  f inanc ia l  
remunerat ion to h is Apost les dur ing th is l i fe.   Qui te the opposi te:  he stated 
that  His Kingdom was not  of  th is  wor ld and refused to be  crowned k ing, at that  
t ime,  by those that intended to see h im as an ear th ly monarch (Jo 6:15).  For 
Chr is t ,  the compensat ions to his Apost les, for  renounc ing secular l i fe,  would be 
reserved only for  a l i fe  beyond phys ical  death.    
Therefore, what should keep them motivated dur ing the t ime they would 
be exerc is ing their  min istry,  would be, in economic language,  th e spread of  the 
psychic  income.  Or compensators , according to the Rat ional Choice Theory.   
Chr is t  ca l ls  at tent ion to the fac t that  a cer ta in rank ing  in the spir i tual service 
can be t rans itory, and i t  wi l l  be only dur ing etern i ty that the def in it ive ranking  
wi l l  be known.  Therefore, those who now are in the f irs t  place of  the ranking  
m ight end up last and v ice-versa.  The assessment is  not only done discrete ly 
but is  a lso an ongoing and cont inuous assessment.   Consequent ly,  what would 
determine the f inal ranking  would not be the fact of  occupying the f irst  posi t ions 
at a certa in point in t ime, but yes, the way in which the performance of  the 
spir i tual  service was done throughout  a whole trajectory of  earth ly l i fe.    
Another rather instruct ive d ia logue , found in the New Testament ,  which 
refers to the way and cr i ter ia under which a promot ion tournament is  
character ized in the Bib le, regarding the receiv ing of  compensation conferred 
for the ef for t  in the spir i tual work , can a lso be found in the Gospel of  Matthew, 
Chapter twenty,  verses 20 –  26.     
 
20 
 
20 Then the mother o f  the sons of  Zeb 'edee came up to 
h im,  wi th  her  sons,  and  kneel ing befo re h im she asked h im fo r  
someth ing.  21 And he sa id to  her ,  "W hat  do you  want?"  She sa id 
to  h im,  "Command that  these two sons of  mine  may s i t ,  one at  
your  r ight  hand and one at  your  le f t ,  in  your  k ingdom."  22 But  
Jesus answered,  "You do not  know what  you are ask ing.  Are you 
able to  dr ink  the cup that  I  am to dr ink?"  They sa id to  h im,  "W e 
are able."  23 He sa id to  them, "You w i l l  dr ink  my cup,  but  to  s i t  
a t  my r ight  hand  and at  my le f t  is  not  mine  to  grant ,  bu t  i t  is  for  
those for  whom i t  has been prepared by my Father . "  24 And when 
the ten heard i t ,  they were ind ignant  a t  the two  brothers .  25 But  
Jesus ca l led them to  h im and s a id,  "You know that  the  ru lers  of  
the Gent i les  lord  i t  over  them,  and the i r  g reat  men exerc ise 
author i t y over  them. 26 I t  shal l  not  be so among you;  but  
whoever would be grea t  among you  must  be  your  servant ,  27 and  
whoever would be f i rs t  among you must  be your s lave;  28 even  
as the Son of  man came not  to  be served but  to  serve,  and to  
g ive h is  l i fe  as a ransom for  many."  
 
  
At the request of  Jacob and John’s mother, ca l led in the text as the sons 
of  Zeb´édee, for  them to be seated at  the r ight  hand and the lef t  hand of  Chr is t  
when he began his  reign, Jesus answers that only the Father can reserve these 
p laces for those who were chosen.  W hosoever  wants  to obtain the f irs t  p laces 
in the Kingdom of  Chr ist ,  occupying the top of  the celest ia l rank ing ,  i t  is  
demanded that such person become a servant of  h is fe l lowmen, the same a s 
He, Chr ist  h imself ,  came to serve humanity.   The marginal benef i t  of  the  
service in the Kingdom of  Chr is t  requires incurr ing beforehand in the 
corresponding marginal cost  re lat ive to that  service.  
In the f igure I ,  not only the marginal benef i t  is  represented, der iv ing f rom 
the ef for t ,  represented in the ver t ical axis ,  but also the marginal cost of  the 
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incurred ef for t    (  ),  both as a funct ion of  the level of  ef for t ,  represe nted in the 
hor izonta l ax is.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The solut ion to the f irst  order of  the problem is g iven  by [(     )  
(     )] ( )    
 (  ),  where    
 .  I f  the marginal benef i t  increased, for  
example, to  [(     )  (     )] ,  the level  of  ef for t  should be increased to   .   
Remember ing that [(     )  (     )] ( )  
  
   
    (  ),  and cons ider ing  
that  ( ) is  the inverse measurement of  the impor tance of  the random effects 
wi thin that  context,  the second impl icat ion is that  the smal ler    ( ) is ,  the lesser  
wi l l  be the level of  ef for t  exerc ised in the balance. This means to say,  as wel l ,  
that the greater the importance of  the random ef fects, the smal ler  wi l l  be the 
ef for t  in the equi l ibr ium.  When the random ef fects are not s ignif icant,  in suc h a 
way that the       d i f ferent ial  is  ins ignif icant,  so then,  ( ) goes to inf in i ty.   I f  
the random ef fec ts are s ignif icant,  th is is  to say,  when the d istr ibut ion of        
has a fat tai l ,   ( ) becomes extremely smal l ,  and the cost  of  the ef for t  becomes 
exceptional ly burdensome, which induces to shirk ing  behavior .   Therefore, the 
h igher the ro le of  the random ef fects in the d ispute, the more the exerc ised 
ef for t  wi l l  dec l ine due to the spread between pr izes
1 1
.   
                                                     
1 1
 Fur ther  on  we wi l l  exp la in ,  through h is to r ica l  examples,  what  types of  e f fects  can  
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Figu re I -  Opt imum ef for t  leve l  
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I f  the dens i ty funct ion were   ̅( )   ( ),  ind icat ing a s ignif icant  ro le of  the 
random ef fects  in  the tournament,  the opt imum ef fort  level  would dec l ine to   ̅,  
as i t  can be observed in f igure 1.  When the random ef fects perform a 
secondary ro le, the corresponding dens i ty funct ion wi l l  be h igher.  
I f  the random ef fects  have a s trong inf luence in the f inal  result  of  the 
tournament, then the compet i tors wi l l  not exert themselves as far  as they could 
in order to win the d ispute.  Hence, in order to induce them to the highest  
endeavors and win the pr ize, avoiding the shirk ing  behavior of  the c ler ics , the 
spread between pr izes  must be ampl i f ied.  In the case of  the Cathol ic Church,  
the spread between pr izes  takes on monetary and non-monetary forms.  Since 
there are cases of  cathol ic c ler ics who do not receive a monetary salary,  the 
expans ion of  the spread must be done,  main ly,  through the increase of  the 
psychic income.  This  means  that there must be an expans ion of  the benef i ts 
and pr iv i leges for the h igher r anks of  the cathol ic h ierarchy.    The object ive 
here is  not  to enter in to deta i l  regarding the h istor ica l aspects  of  th is quest ion,  
but,  in fact,  evident ly th is was what happened in several moments in the his tory 
of  the Cathol ic Church, when the h igher - rank ing c ler ics , wi th in their  h ierarchy,  
began receiv ing many benef i ts.    
Given the work  of fer  represented by equation (2),  the problem of  the 
re l ig ious f irm is  given by:  
 
   
        
   
[(     )  (     )]
 
                   ( ) 
 
s . t .  
[(     )  (     )]
 
  ( )                             ( ) 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
random ef fects  have on the leve l  o f  e f fo r t  exerc ised by t he  c ler ics  in  a  tournament .    
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What equation (4) expla ins is that c ler ics must receive enough, in  
average, in order to feel  incent ivated, to exerc ise their  maximum ef fort .   Being    
the cost re lated to the ef for t  exerc ised,  
[(     ) (     )]
 
 represents the salary 
expected, what each par t ic ipant expects to receive.  W hen subst i tut ing (4) into 
(3) the maximizat ion problem turns into :  
 
                                
   
        
   ( )
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
The f i rst  order condi t ions , therefore,  are:  
                                                      
 
   
 (    ( ))
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                                                                   (5)  
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The solut ion for  the equat ion system in (5)  impl ies  in    ( )   .   The 
re l ig ious f irm should  establ ish a remunerat ion scheme, according to the resul ts 
stated above, through which the compet i tors are incent ivated to exerc ise a 
level of  ef for t ,  to the point where, their  marginal cost is  the same as their  
marginal benef i t .   In th is way, tournaments prove to be ef f ic ient s ince they  
st imulate the c ler ics  to exerc ise an opt imum ef fort  level ,  throughout their  whole 
career  and in a l l  hierarchical  levels.   Subst i tut ing    ( )     in  (2) we can f ind 
the opt imal  remunerat ion spread,  g iven by:   
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[(     )  (     )]  
 
 ( )
        ( ) 
                                  
 
Equat ion (6) ,  together  wi th equat ion (4) form a system of  two equat ions  
wi th two unknown quant i t ies , consider ing          e           .  As we can 
see in (6) ,  the remunerat ion spread var ies  inversely wi th the density funct ion 
that ref lec ts the importance of  the random ef fects. The h igher the ro le of  the 
random ef fects, the lower  ( ) is ,  and the h igher the remunerat ion spread 
should be in order to avoid a shirk ing  behavior among the par t ic ipants,  s ince by 
the system formed by  (4)  and (6)  we have:  
 
 
 ( )  
 
  ( )
                                     ( ) 
 
Equat ion (7) informs us that the h igher the ro le of  the random ef fects  
wi thin the promot ion tournament ,   ( ) wi l l  be lower  and, the h igher wi l l  be the 
cost  assoc iated to a part icu lar  level of  ef for t .    
The importance of  the tournament us ing re lat ive compar isons is that they 
exc lude “common noises” that  agents averse to r isk  do not wish to hear .  In this  
case, the consequence of  the random ef fects is  ident ical on both indiv iduals 
and, therefore, the indiv idual who obta ins the best performance might be 
chosen as the winner even though his  absolute result  may have been 
compromised by external  var iables.  
Applicat ion:  The inverse relat ionship between random ef fects and ef for t  
exerc ised by the part ic ipants  in  a tournament  might  expla in,  at least  in  par t ,  the 
moral lax ity in which a par t of  the cathol ic c ler ics l ived. This fac t inc luded  even 
some of  i ts  Pont i f fs ,  such as Alexander VI  (Nunes, 2007, p.116-117; Duf fy, 
1998, 146-147) , dur ing the per iod immediate ly before the Cathol ic Counter -
Reformat ion of  the XVI
t h
 century,  rat i f ied by the Counc i l  of  Trent  (1545 -1563),  
and the re lat ively scarce ef for ts some cler ics exer c ised when performing their  
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minis try.    
At the t ime, the e lect ion of  a Roman Pont i f f  was inf luenced by pol i t ica l  
and economic cr i ter ia, where inf luent ia l  secular author i t ies  managed to 
interfere in the elect ion of  Popes.  Rich and powerfu l  famil ies,  such a s the 
Medic i ’s  and the Borgia´s, contended the nominat ion of  one of  their  members 
for  the of f ice of  Pont i f f ,  dur ing the per iod immediately preceding the Cathol ic 
Counter-Reformat ion.    
On the other hand,  the s igning of  Concordats,  such as the one of  
Bologna wi th France (Duf fy, 1998, p.153), and the Padroado
1 2
,  th is is ,  the r ight  
of  introduc ing c ler ics for  an ecc les iast ic benef i t  (Praça,1869, p.15), conferred 
by the Popes to secular governors, besides the o ld pract ice of  s imony (sale of 
sacred appointments) ,  were interference factors  in  the eccle s iast ic  l i fe of  the 
Church (R. J .  Sturz, in Elwel l ,  p . 94,95, v. I I I ,  1990).  Those facts ,  act ing ei ther  
indiv idual ly or col lect ive ly, worked as random ef fects that  harmed the 
performance and the ef for t  of  the Ca thol ic c ler ica l c lass.  The branch of  the 
c lergy that was committed with the real,  more spir i tual ized fundamentals  of  the 
Cathol ic doctr ine, d id not,  in fac t,  have  control  of  the Church,  because th is 
control was in the hands of  the more secular ized and mat er ia l is t ic  branch.  This 
correlat ion of  power  only changed wi t h the Counc i l  of  Trent ,  when  more 
spir i tual ized c ler ics began to be at the head of  the purpose of  the Cathol ic  
Church.       
Stark  (2003, p. 40-41;  2005, p. 202-203) susta ins that,  at that moment  in 
t ime,  the two churches l ived together (coex isted) : one was the “Church of  
Piety” ,  wi th ascet ic c ler ics, who defended a s imple l i fe .   The other one was the 
“Church of  Power” ,  which ef fect ive ly began i ts ex istence af ter  the ascens ion of  
Constant ine, who establ ished the Decree of  Mi lan (313) , conceding not  only 
re l ig ious f reedom to the Chr is t ians, but a ser ies of  pr iv i leges to the c ler ics .   
Besides, some of  the h igh posts wi thin the cathol ic h ierarchy, s ince having 
become so prest ig ious and carrying so muc h soc ial status ,  were bought and 
                                                     
1 2
 In  re la t ion to  the Por tuguese Padroado and i t s  re f lec t ion on Colonia l  Brazi l ,  see the 
observat ion  of  Carre i ro  (2007,  p .  68,  69) .   
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occupied, l i tera l ly,  by members of  the h igher  socia l c lasses, according to Stark 
(2003 p. 40) .  Stark  a lso af f irms that  the Church of  Piety was born as a react ion 
against the Church of  Power and i ts excesses, v indicat ing a r eturn to pr imit ive 
Chr is t ianity.    
Against these and other forms of  abuse, a ser ies of  c leans ing in it iat ives 
appeared, centur ies before the Cathol ic Reformat ion, such as dur ing the per iod 
of  Pope Gregory Magnum (590 –  614), the f irst  monk to occupy the pos t of  
Roman Pont i f f ,  who sought to repress s imony and at tempted to moral ize the 
c lergy.     
The emergence of  the Protestant Reformation cata lyzed the ef for ts 
sought out ,  for  a long t ime, by the Church of  Piety
1 3
,  leading to the convocat ion  
of  the Counci l  of  Trent (1545-1563).  This Counci l  establ ished moral izing and 
d iscip l inary measures,  such as the abol i t ion of  the sale of  ecc lesiast ic of f ice 
and the inst i tu t ion of  a large network  of  seminar ies in order to prepare the 
cathol ic c ler ics in the most appropr iate  way for each ex ist ing d iocese (Ekelund 
Jr,  2006, p. 135-160;  Royal ,  2006, p. 173;  F.S. Piggin, in Elwel l ,  v. I ,  1993,  
p.312-314) . F.S. Piggin ( in Elwel l ,  v. I ,  1993,  p.313) says that:   
 
The repentan t  ep iscopate recognized that  the Lutheran  
revol t  had been o r ig inated by the “ambi t ion ,  avar ic iousness and 
greed” of  the b ishops.   The Counci l ,  there fore,  condemned the 
absenteeism of  the b ishops and pr ies ts .   The  c ler ics  should 
“avoid  even the smal les t  fau l ts ,  that  in  them would be  
cons iderable”
 1 3
.    
                                                     
1 3
 Accord ing to  Sta rk  (2003,  p .  40)  the Protestant  Reformat ion and  the Cathol ic  
Counter-Refo rmat ion were events  whereof  the i r  beginn ing  was assoc iated to  the 
monast ica l  movement  that  began in  the I I I  century ,  rooted in  the Jewish ascet ic ism 
(such as the Qunrã communi ty) ,  which a l ready p roposed the reform of  the pract ices of  
the Chr is t ian Church.   The expans ion of  monaquism or  monast ic ism coinc ided wi th  
explos ive increase  of  a r is tocrats  in  the Chr is t ian c lergy.   By the middle of  the  IV  
century there were thousands of  monks and nuns,  l iv ing in  o rganized  communi t ies .  
Due to  the i r  l i ves of  devot ion and  ascet ic ism, they were cons idered sp i r i tua l ly super ior  
to  the members of  the secular  c lergy.    Thei r  c lashes wi th  them, accord ing to  Sta rk  
were not  due to  the fact  that  the secular  c lergy d id  not  fo l low ascet ic ism but  because 
many of  them lead an immoral  l i fe .         
1 3
 In  the coun tr ies  where there are State churches,  such as the case of  the Angl ican 
Church in  England and the Lutheran Church in  Sweden,  where the c le r i cs  are pa id by 
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The inf luence of  pol i t ica l  and economic cr i ter ia in the choice of  c ler ics ,  
at the t ime before the Counc i l  of  Trent,  ref lec ted a substant ia l  weight of  the 
random ef fects on the promot ion tournaments for  the choice of  cathol ic pr iests , 
which implied, on their  par t ,  a h igher cost assoc iated to the level of  re l ig ious 
ef for t  to be exerc ised.  This, evident ly ,  d iscouraged the compromise of  the 
c ler ics wi th their  ecclesiast ica l dut ies  and contr ibuted towards lax ity in 
behavior  and conduct  on their  par t .   The t r ident ine cr i te r ia establ ished more 
rat ional i t y for  the select ion of  new c le r ics ,  among which ex igencies were  the 
fact that  candidates to pr ies thood should at tend a cathol ic seminary before 
being ordained.  
Pol i t ica l  in terference in the appointment of  c ler ics was also op posed.   
These had the ro le of  reduc ing the random ef fects in the promot ion process of  
the c ler ics and, thus,  consequent ly,  s t imulate the increase of  the ef for t  
exerc ised in order to obtain access to h igher h ierarchical pos it ions, improving 
the prof i le of  the candidates qual i ta t ive ly.   Nowadays, c iv i l  author it ies have los t 
the condi t ion of  exer t ing any inf luence in the appointment  of  cathol ic c ler ics,  
whether i t  be in terms of  elec t ion, nominat ion, des ignat ion or in troduct ion of  
these,  as  in  the case of  Bishops (Canon 377 § 5 of  the  1983 Code of  Canon Law ) .  
 
3.2. Simple model of  Promotion Tournament with investment in rel igious 
human capital and clerics with homogeneous skil ls.  
 
 In th is subsect ion , we wi l l  present a vers ion of  Câmara´s Tournaments  
model (2002),  which inc ludes the possib i l i t y of  the part ic ipants  in  the promotion 
tournament to invest in human capita l.   However, here we wi l l  consider an  
adaptat ion of  the model for  the purpose of  th is work , spec if ica l ly for  re l ig ious 
                                                                                                                                                              
the State,  s ince they are publ ic  servants ,  there  is  a  tendency in  that  po l i t ica l  issues 
in f luence the promot ion cr i ter ia  o f  the c ler ics ,  increas ing the amount  o f  random 
ef fects .  Thus,  there is  a  tendency of  these c ler ics  adopt ing a shi rk ing  behavior  due to  
a lack of  compet i t ion,  as i t  has been pointed out  by Adam Smith in  The W eal th  of  the 
Nat ions [See a lso Iannaccone,  F inke and Sta rk  (1997) and Gi l l  (1999)] .    
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organizat ions.  Instead of  t he wider concept of  human capita l ,  cons idered by 
Câmara in h is  work , the concept of  re l ig ious human capi ta l wi l l  be cons idered.   
The main modif icat ion is the inc lus ion of  psychic income or non -monetary 
income in the model ,  in a s imilar  way to what was done  wi th the Lazear and 
Rosen model (1981) , presented in the previous subsect ion.   
The model  has one stage and two compet ing c ler ics,    and  ,  who 
present  a d if ferent iated product ion funct ion g iven by    (   ),  where µ 
represents  the ef for t ,    is  the religious capital of the cleric,  (   )    and     ⁄  
       ⁄           ⁄   ,        ⁄   .  The cost function is given by  (   )    ( )    ( ) 
in which   ( )     ( )=0,      ( )        ( )         ( )         ( )   .  The cler ics have 
ident ica l funct ions, both in terms of  product ion and cost,  present ing in th is way,  
homogeneous abi l i t ies .  Bes ides, they present  neutra l i t y to r isk .   
The re l igious organizat ion wi l l  observe the product ion    of  each c ler ic  
par t ic ipat ing in the tournament ,  which wi l l  be a funct ion of   (   ),  mul t ip l ied by 
a random error    common to both c ler ics  part ic ipat ing in the tournament .   
Here, we cons ider the common error and not indiv idual and indepe ndent errors , 
s ince the heavier the weight  of  the common error the h igher  the ef f ic iency of  
the tournament .   In  th is way,  c ler ics    and  ,  wi l l  present the fo l lowing indiv idual  
product ions:   
 
    (     )  
                                                                                                      (1)                                                                                                        
    (     )  
 
 
 The probabi l i t y  (   ) of  c ler ic    overcoming c ler ic      wi l l  be g iven by:  
 
 
                        (   )  
 (    )
 (    )  (    )
                                                   (2)  
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Where the random factor   ,  that is  common to both c ler ics and has the 
propr iety of  being mult ip l iable, is  annulled, and does not af fect the probabil i t y 
of  the two c ler ics to win the d ispute.  
For the problem of  maximizat ion of  each one of  the c ler ics, an a lterat ion 
of  Câmara ’s (2002)  model wi l l  be made, wh ich is the inc lusion of  the psychic  
income dif ferent ia l between c ler ics.   Therefore ,  we have that :  
 
          (   )(     )  [   (   )](     )   (     )                            (3)  
 
As in the previous s imple model ,  wi thout rel ig ious human capi ta l  
investment ,    and    represent,  respect ive ly,  the monetary and non -monetary 
income of  the c ler ic who obta ins the f irs t  place in the Tournament ( that of  
Bishop or  Supervisor ) ;     and    represent  the same th ing for  the c ler ic  
c lassif ied in second p lace (ass istant) .   W it h that,  the remunerat ion  of  the 
Supervisor or Bishop wi l l  be           and the remunerat ion of  the ass istant  
wi l l  be         .  Bes ides, as  in the previous case, having               
and consequent ly      ,  for  the marginal ef for t  to be pos it ive.   Subst i tu t ing 
(2) into (3)  we have that :  
               
   
    
 (     )
 (     )   (     )
(     )  [  
 (     )
 (     )   (     )
] (     )
  (     )                                                                                               ( ) 
 
                                                                                                                               
 The f i rst  order condi t ions  wi l l  be g iven by:  
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[ ( )   ( )] 
(     )  
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                                                        ( ) 
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 ( )
[ ( )   ( )] 
(     )  
  ( )
   
                                                    ( ) 
 
 
   W here:  
 
 ( )   (     ) 
 ( )   (     ) 
 ( )   (     ) 
         
         
 
 
Rewr it ing equat ions (5) and (6),  the result  is :  
 
                                 
 ( )(     )
[ ( )   ( )] 
 
  ( )
   
  ( )
   
                                                               ( ) 
 
                                
 ( )(     )
[ ( )   ( )] 
 
  ( )
   
  ( )
   
                                                               ( ) 
 
 
In  th is manner,  the f irst  order  condit ions (F.O.C)  wi l l  be respected when :   
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 ( )(     )
[ ( )   ( )] 
                                                                      ( ) 
 
  
Where     ( )  
  ( )
   
    ( )  
  ( )
   
,    
 
( )  
  ( )
   
  and   
 
( )  
  ( )
   
  
 
 
The condi t ions of  the second order require that the one der ived f rom the 
c ler ics  maximizat ion funct ion  ,  g iven by equat ion (4),  be a negative semi 
def ined Hess ian matr ix.    
In  th is way,  we have that :   
 
   ( ) {
   
 
( )
  
 
( )
 
   
 
( )
[ ( )   ( )]
}     ( )    
                                                                                    (10)                                                   
   ( ) {
   
 
( )
  
 
( )
 
   
 
( )
[ ( )   ( )]
}     ( )    
 
  The same reasoning is appl ied for  c ler ic  .  Rewr it ing equat ion (9)  we 
have that :   
 
                                              
  
 
( )
  
 
( )
 
   ( )
   ( )
   
 ( )(     )
[ ( )   ( )] 
                                       (  ) 
 
 The equat ion above indicates that ,  in a s i tuat ion of  balance, the marginal 
subst i tut ion rate (MSR) between     and   ,  th is is  to say,  between the ef for t  of  
c ler ic    and his re l ig ious capi tal ,  must be equal to h is marginal subst i tut ion cost  
(MSC).  I t  a lso informs that those var iables depend upon the spread between 
pr izes , whether  monetary or  non-monetary.     
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Equat ion (11) indicates that the values re lated to ef for t  and re l ig ious 
human capita l chosen by c ler ic   ,  g iven respect ive ly by     and   ,  wi l l  depend on 
the spread between monetary income and non-monetary income (psychic 
income),  g iven, respect ive ly,  by     and    .   Here,  d if ferent ly f rom the Câmara 
(2002)  model ,  where     should be pos it ive,  due to the inc lus ion of  the non -
monetary income,     may assume a nul l  va lue, but only i f      is  pos i t ive for  
the c ler ics who par t ic ipate in the tournament to have incent ives to do their  best  
and invest in rel ig ious human capi tal .  According to what has been expla ined in 
the s imple model,  and seen previous ly, the case of  the Inst i tu tes of  
Consecrated L ife of  the Cathol ic  Church are a n excel lent  example in which     
can be nul l ,  s ince the regu lar c ler ics that  belong to them  do not receive a 
monetary salary,  cons ider ing that they are bound to the vow of  poverty.   
St i l l  observing equat ion (11) , i t  can be perceived that an increase e ither  
in    and/or  in   ,  increases the rat io  on the r ight  hand s ide of  the equation. 
W ith the object ive of  mainta in ing the equali ty,  the rat io between the marginal  
cost  and the marginal  product  of      and   ,  on the lef t  hand s ide,  should a lso 
increase correspondingly.   This  means that an increase in    and/or  in      
g ives r ise to an increase of  the ef for t      and of  the investment in re l ig ious 
capi ta l     of  c ler ic   .   Ident ica l reasoning is  appl ied to c ler ic  .  
In equat ions (9) and (11) the ef fects of  the var iat ions of  the product ion 
funct ion of  c ler ic    are not  constant,  s ince  ( ) is  present  both in  the numerator  
as  in  the denominator  of  the equat ions.  Therefore,  increases in  ( )  when i ts 
value is  suf f ic ient ly small ,  wi l l  imply in  cor responding increases in  ( ),  unt i l  
there is a balance in  ( ).   Beyond that point,  increases in  ( ) wi l l  imply 
corresponding decreases in  ( ).   This means that c ler ic   wil l  respond to the  
increase of  ef for t  and of  re l ig ious capi ta l  investment  of  c ler ic    equivalent ly,  
wi th the object ive of  winning the tournament , according to the descr ipt ion in 
equat ion (9) unt i l  there is a balance.  Beyond that point,  i t  wi l l  not  compe nsate, 
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in terms of  benef i t ,  for  c ler ic   to increase    and    ,  where the cost   (   ) wi l l  
be so h igh that the c ler ic prefers  not  to cont inue d isput ing the tournament.    
Equat ion (11)  informs the ent ire range of  opt imum choices in terms o f     
and   ,  in order to sat isfy the F.O.C.  so to maximize the indiv idual ut i l i t y of  the 
c ler ic .   In th is way, wi th the a im of  obta in ing the best  response funct ion, each 
opt imal  bundle must  be subst i tu ted ,  in  (4) ,  by a feas ib le equivalent  var iable 
  (     )       .   W ith th is,  the funct ion to be maximized would be the  
fol lowing:   
 
   
  
 (  )
 (  )   (  )
(     )  [  
 (  )
 (  )   (  )
] (     )
  (  )                                                                                                     (  ) 
 
 
The F.O.C.  condit ions wi l l  be g iven by :  
 
                 
  (  ) (  )
[ (  )   (  )]
 (     )    (  )                                                             (  )    
 
The second order condit ions wi l l  be g iven by:   
 
 
         (  ) {
   (  )
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   (  )
[ (  )   (  )]
 }    (  )                                           (  ) 
 
 
The react ion funct ion of  c ler ic    wi l l  be g iven by:  
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The react ion funct ion of  c ler ic    wil l  be symmetr ica l .   Both react ions  
funct ions are represented in the fo l lowing f igure :  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I I ,  as wel l  as the react ion funct ion in (15),  ind icates that,  
cons ider ing the ex is tence of  a Nash balance in pure s trategies,  i t  wi l l  result  in    
  
    
 ,  which der ives in   
    
   and    
    
     This is ,  in the balance, both 
c ler ics  wi l l  present the same level of  ef for t  and investment  of  re l igious human 
capi ta l ,  where the probabi l i t ies of  each one of  them winning the tournament wil l  
be equal  to  (   )       
 
 
4. Advantages and Limitations of the Tournament Theory  in Rel igious 
Organizat ions 
 
   
  
  
 
  
  
 
   
 
  
     
      
 
     
Figu re I I -  Bes t  rep l y  curves  o f  the c ler ics  
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According to Zech (2001) , promot ion tournaments represent an ef f ic ient  
contract for  the pr inc ipal-agent  re lat ionship involv ing re l ig ious organizat ions 
and c ler ics.  In churches with several congregat ions, that present several  
degrees of  r iches and prest ige, c ler ics who aim at reaching a post in a larger  
congregat ion f irst  need to prove a good performance in the congregat ion where 
they are serving.     
Zech (2001)  ment ions d if ferent cases of  promot ion tournaments  in  
churches, in the Uni ted States.  The American Episcopal ian Church, for  
example, has a centra l  department, the Church Deployment Of f ice,  in the c ity of  
New York , that takes care of  the select ion and h ir ing of  c ler ics for  their  
congregat ions.  Any Episcopal ian congregat ion interested in hi r ing a c ler ic  
establ ishes a committee that es tabl ishes the prof i le of  the desired candidate  
and gets in touch wi th the centra l of f ice, where Episcopal ian c ler ics must keep 
their  personal  information up to date every year .  At the most ,  100 candidates 
are selected.  The committee interviews the shor t l is ted contestants and the 
chosen person is  submitted to the b ishop of  the congregation for  approval .   
Another case of  promot ion tournaments ment ioned  in Zech is that of  the 
American Presbyter ian Church.  The Presbyter ian ministers , interested in 
obtain ing a post as Pastor of  a congregat ion where there is  an open vaca ncy,  
must submit their  curr iculums, to be selected, to a centra l commit tee des igned 
for that purpose.  A board of  the presbytery f rom the congregat ion wi thout a 
pastor v is i ts the congregation of  each candidate and analyses h is  performance 
dur ing the sermons.  When the central committee and the congregat ional board 
approve and select  a candidate, h is name is submit ted to the vote of  the  
congregat ion,  which has a vacancy for  a min ister ,  for  his  approval .    
On the other hand, as  observed by Conyon and Sadler ( 2001, p.154) the 
Tournament Theory has a lso suf fered restr ic t ions f rom some researchers .  They 
c ite Dye (1984) who points  out certa in l im itat ions of  the Tournament Theory,  
among others , in what measure i t  would be v iable to bui ld an appropr iate  
incent ives p lan; the d if f icu l t ies of  assessment  of  the mult id imens ional 
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performance in an ord inal sense; as well  as the problems of  coal i t ion and 
sabotage among the part ic ipants in the tournament
1 5
.   
Conyon and Sadler  (2001, p. 154) a lso mention the work  of  Baker  et a l i i  
(1988) that quest ion the per t inence of  the use of  tournaments  as an incent ive 
mechanism, espec ia l ly in  the case of  promoting non -qual i f ied compet i tors  for  
posts of  command.  Although this quest ioning of  Baker et a l i i  can not be 
d iscarded, th is never could be taken as a ru le, but only as an except ion, s ince 
promot ion tournaments seek exact ly to select those who present the best  
performance, throughout success ive s tages of  a compet i t ion, for  pos i t ions of  
command. The more the s tages of  a tournament, the h igher  wi l l  be the 
probabi l i t y that the best candidates become the winners.  Therefore, the 
solut ion to the problem of  eventual ly choosing a competi tor  who is not the most 
able among the candidates is  to increase the stages of  the tournament.     
The Tournament Theory,  st i l l  according to Conyon and  Sadler (2001),  
foresees that the pr ize in  d ispute wi l l  be so much the b igger the larger the 
amount of  par t ic ipants. In a re l ig ious f irm, th is means that ,  the more the 
number of  h ierarchical  levels , the b igger shou ld be the pr ize to be d isputed for  
the highest post.   This pr ize does not necessar i ly involve monetary income 
only,  being a lso poss ib le to accrue in the shape of  psychic income, as pointed 
out by Zech (2001).   
In summary,  the fol lowing advantages can be po inted out in favor of  the 
use of  Promot ion Tournaments as an instrument to incent ivate the performance 
of  agents in a re l ig ious organizat ion:   
a)  Lower measurement  cost  of  the agents performance;  
b)  Random factors , that  af fect agents in a global manner, tend to 
become neutral ized by the re lat ive assessment, increas ing the impact of  the 
incent ives;  
                                                     
1 5
 The quest ion of  sabotage in  promot ion tournaments  was s tud ied by Cheng (2003)  
regard ing i ts  nature ,  determinators  and impact .   Cheng a lso proposes poss ib le 
so lut ions for  th is  p roblem.   Th is  quest ion wi l l  be broached present l y.   
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c)  Higher probabi l i t y that the best candidates wi l l  be chosen for 
leadership posts , especial ly i f  the stages of  the tournament are increased.  
 
Among the d isadvantages of  p romot ion Tournaments are:   
a)  Poss ib i l i t y of  coal i t ion of  agents adopt ing a shirk ing  behavior.  This  
poss ib i l i t y tends to decrease the larger the number of  agents , main ly in the 
case of  organizat ions wi th many h ierarchical levels or ,  in the case of  h ir ing 
employees f rom outs ide the f irm.  In the case of  re l ig ious organizat ions, such 
as the Cathol ic  Church,  the h ir ing of  outs iders does not ex ist .  
b)  Another  poss ib i l i ty is  that of  each part ic ipant of  the tournament 
adopt ing sabotage pract ices in order to h inder h is compet itors f rom winning the 
pr ize.   
In  the case of  re l ig ious organizat ions,  however,  such as the Cathol ic  
Church, these problems tend to become nul l i f ied, or  at least min imized,  
because of  i ts  larger number of  hierarchical  levels and s ince love of  fel lowmen 
is a mandatory commandment to be observed by c ler ics and laymen. For th is ,  
shirk ing  behavior and sabotage, in theory, are problems that tend to occur in  a 
lesser  scale in  re l ig ious promot ion tournaments .  
In th is manner, for  example, in order to e l im inate d istor t ions such as 
sabotage in the e lect ion of  the Roman Pont i f f ,  a cruc ia l stage of  the 
Tournament in the Cathol ic  Church, i t  is  interest ing to observe what  ar t ic les  79  
to 83 of  the Aposto l ica l Const i tu t ion Univers i Dominic i  Gregis regarding this  
issue (Chapter VI –  MATTERS TO BE OBSERVED OR AVOIDED IN THE 
ELECTION OF THE ROMAN PONTIFF):    
 
79. Confirming the prescriptions of my Predecessors, I likewise 
forbid anyone, even if he is a Cardinal, during the Pope's lifetime and 
without having consulted him, to make plans concerning the election of 
his successor, or to promise votes, or to make decisions in this regard 
in private gatherings. 
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80. In the same way, I wish to confirm the provisions made by 
my Predecessors for the purpose of excluding any external interference 
in the election of the Supreme Pontiff. Therefore, in virtue of holy 
obedience and under pain of excommunication latae sententiae, I again 
forbid each and every Cardinal elector, present and future, as also the 
Secretary of the College of Cardinals and all other persons taking part 
in the preparation and carrying out of everything necessary for the 
election, to accept under any pretext whatsoever, from any civil 
authority whatsoever, the task of proposing the veto or the so-called 
exclusiva, even under the guise of a simple desire, or to reveal such 
either to the entire electoral body assembled together or to individual 
electors, in writing or by word of mouth, either directly and personally or 
indirectly and through others, both before the election begins and for its 
duration. I intend this prohibition to include all possible forms of 
interference, opposition and suggestion whereby secular authorities of 
whatever order and degree, or any individual or group, might attempt to 
exercise influence on the election of the Pope. 
81. The Cardinal electors shall further abstain from any form of 
pact, agreement, promise or other commitment of any kind which could 
oblige them to give or deny their vote to a person or persons. If this 
were in fact done, even under oath, I decree that such a commitment 
shall be null and void and that no one shall be bound to observe it; and I 
hereby impose the penalty of excommunication latae sententiae upon 
those who violate this prohibition. It is not my intention however to 
forbid, during the period in which the See is vacant, the exchange of 
views concerning the election. 
82. I likewise forbid the Cardinals before the election to enter 
into any stipulations, committing themselves of common accord to a 
certain course of action should one of them be elevated to the 
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Pontificate. These promises too, should any in fact be made, even 
under oath, I also declare null and void. 
83. With the same insistence shown by my Predecessors, I 
earnestly exhort the Cardinal electors not to allow themselves to be 
guided, in choosing the Pope, by friendship or aversion, or to be 
influenced by favour or personal relationships towards anyone, or to be 
constrained by the interference of persons in authority or by pressure 
groups, by the suggestions of the mass media, or by force, fear or the 
pursuit of popularity. Rather, having before their eyes solely the glory of 
God and the good of the Church, and having prayed for divine 
assistance, they shall give their vote to the person, even outside the 
College of Cardinals, who in their judgment is most suited to govern the 
universal Church in a fruitful and beneficial way. 
 
The determinat ions are very c lear and have as object ive to d issuade 
indiv iduals and groups of  interest  engaged in obta ining personal  a dvantage in 
the success ion of  the Roman Pont i f f .   The hypothes is of  negot iat ions, in th is  
sense, are not  admitted whi le the Ponti f f  is  s t i l l  a l ive, wi thout  h is consent ,  even 
though those involved hold a seat in the College of  Cardina ls.  Compromises 
and pacts  previous ly agreed upon, to be put into pract ice,  in the hypothes is 
that this or that indiv idual being e lected for  the of f ice of  Pont i f f ,  in the case of  
a vacant see, are tota l ly unauthor ized and have no value at a l l  in jur id ica l 
terms.  Any del iberat ion in these terms is cons idered inval id  jur id ica l ly ,  even 
when done under  pr ivate oath.  
Art ic le 83 is the one which interests most  in th is d iscuss ion, s ince i t  
urges the e lectors of  the Col lege of  Cardinals to adhere to the spir i t  of  the 
Gospel and avoid any mean-spir i ted att i tudes, which inc lude sabotage, in the 
case of  the success ion of  a Pont i f f .   Qui te the oppos ite, they must endeavor to 
leave out any personal issues, seek ing not to use as cr i ter ia for  choice, l in ks of 
f r iendship or feel ings,  l is tening to reason in order to choose the best candidate  
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among al l  the poss ib le opt ions, even i f  the chosen one were not a Cardinal.  
Beyond th is ,  the e lectors of  the Col lege of  Cardinals must  not a l low themselves 
to be inf luenced by pressure, be i t  of  society,  the med ia, fear,  apprehension or 
for  the search of  project ion.  Therefore,  the poss ib i l i t ies of  a sabotaging 
behavior on the Cardinals par t,  in order to obstruct the e lect ion of  a g iven 
contestant,  may not be e l im inated but at  least min imized and contro l led.    
 
4.1.  Risk and distortion in Promotion Tournaments  
 
As seen in Lazear and Gibbs (2008), t wo fundamental  issues,  to be 
cons idered, regarding the advantages and d isadvantages in tournaments are 
r isk  and d istort ion.  
Risk  –  Tak ing into account a re l ig ious f irm with two cler ics , one who 
leads a congregat ion in the c i ty of    and another one who is  the leader of  the 
congregat ion in the c ity of   ,  their  performance is  af fected not only by the 
ef for t ,  g iven by   (as  d iscussed in sect ion 3),  but also by random ef fects 
(commonly cal led good or bad luck).   I t  is  supposed these factors are d iv ided 
into two:  the f irst  is  made up by the combined set of  local fac tors (such as the 
level  of  re l ig iousness in each of  both c i t ies) a nd the behavior,  strategies and 
act ions of  the c ler ics in each of  their  respect ive local  markets, which might be 
cal led id iosyncrat ic .   This fac tor  is  represented by  .    
The second factor ,  represented by  ,  is  re lated to ord inary events that 
might  af fec t both the local markets , such as a government intervent ion in the 
re l ig ious market,  demographic fac tors , or  a recess ion or a nat ional or  wor ldwide 
economic depress ion.   This lat ter  type of  event ,  according to Iannaccone 
(1988),  tends to increase re l igious  f requency in churches, s ince the increase of  
unemployed people, the re lat ive value of  t ime for these individuals decreases,  
a l lowing them to a l locate part  of  th is t ime to at tend re l ig ious services. In th is 
way,  the f requency in the congregat ions of  both c ler ics increases, but th is  
cannot  be cons idered a resul t  of  their  performance.        
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Keeping these considerat ions in v iew, the marginal  product iv i ty of  both 
c ler ics  wi l l  be g iven by:   
 
            
                                                 
 
The term that represents the common factors ,   ,  does not  present  a 
subscr ipt  s ince i t  af fects both local  markets ,   and   in  an ident ica l manner.   In  
the occurrence of  using a tournament to select the c ler ic who wil l  be promoted,  
then the winner wi l l  be the one that has the best re lat ive performance in both 
local markets.  In the case of  tak ing the relat ive performance of  the c ler ic in the 
c ity of   ,  as  an assessment cr i ter ion, we have that :  
 
                      (       )              
 
Where              .  W hen a standard assessment is  used,  we have 
that          .  The tournament  d if fers f rom the standard assessment  in three 
main aspects: a)  by the fac t that the term  ,  that af fects both c ler ics , is  
e l im inated, reduc ing the term of  error  for  the c ler ic of  the c ity of  J;  b)  there is  
an inf luence of  the ef for t  d ispended by the c ler ic  of  the c i ty of   ,  g iven by     
and c) inc lus ion of  the local factors that af fect the performance of  the c ler ic of  
the c i ty of   .   
The var iance of  the two performance measures, both in the s tandard 
assessment,  as  in  the case of  the tournaments,  cons ider ing that    and i ts  
res idues are not corre lated,  is  given by:  
 
  
    
    
  (                   ) 
    
     
 (           ) 
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A s ituat ion in which i t  would be advantageous to employ Tournaments 
would be that  one in which the common factors , represented b y  ,  have a more 
impor tant ro le over the performance of  the c ler ics of  both c i t ies in re lat ion to 
the weight  of  the local fac tors  on th is per formance.  I f  th is  were the case,  
tournaments would reduce the r isks, improving the incent ives.  However, i f  the 
idiosyncrat ic fac tors have a predominant ro le, the s tandard assessment  would 
be the most  advisable.    
Distortion  –  Tournaments,  in a general way,  can d istor t  the incent ives 
that  the workers have to cooperate each other .   Let us consider a mult i task 
model in which each worker can exert two k inds of  ef for t .   The f i rst  type,      is  
performed by the workers in order  to benef i t  their  own indiv idual  performance.   
The second type of  ef for t  d imin ishes the pe rformance of  another  competi tor  and 
is  g iven by   .   In  th is way,  in  a s imple sabotage model ,  the absolute 
performance measure for compet ing workers  is  given by:   
 
      
    
       
      
    
       
 
The re lat ive assessment  for  worker J is  g iven by:   
 
              (  
    
      )  (  
    
      )
 (  
    
 )  (  
    
 )  (     ) 
 
In the case of  Tournaments , a worker can improve h is performance in  
two ways:   increasing h is own ef for t ,    ,  and act ing in a way that  sabotages the 
performance of  another  compet itor ,    .  On the other  hand,  when the evaluat ion 
is through indiv idual  performance, there are no ex ist ing incent ives for  
sabotage.  I t  is  essent ia l  to cal l  at tent ion , however ,  to the fact that ,  in  
tournaments in re l ig ious organizat ions, as in the case of  the Cathol ic Church, i t  
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is  expected that c ler ics, who observe the commandment of  loving their  
fel lowmen as they love themselves, loose any st imulus in commit t ing acts  of  
sabotage to impair  h is compet itors.   This behavior ,  th is  is  to say,  sabotage,  
must be seen as an except ion in re l ig ious organizat ions.    
Coming back to the previous example,  that  of  the c ler ics  of  c i t ies   and 
 ,  i t  is  necessary to  remember a spec if ic i ty of  re l ig ious organizat ions: the 
re lat ive independence in the ef for t  exer ted by the c ler ics when seek ing a 
promot ion.  The c ler ic of  the c i ty of    does not  need to sabotage the c ler ic  of  the 
c ity of   in order to obta in the pr ize.  His congregat ion (or par ish)  has prec ise 
jur isd ict ion l im its.   Cannon 265 of  the CCL does not admit,  for  ins tance,  
unattached or transient  c ler ics , s ince al l  o f  them must be incardinated in a 
church.  Each presbyter –  par ish pr iest has to exer t their  pasto rship in their  
own par ish. The poss ibi l i t y of  tr ying to at tract the fa ithfu l of  another c ler ic ’s  
par ish, in order to increase their  own, is  not admissib le,  no mat ter by what  
means or  strategies. This would be contrary to the spir i t  of  brotherhood and 
char i ty preached by the church, v io lat ing the object ives the church a ims to 
reach, among which are the preservat ion and the promulgat ion of  the revealed 
truth, through the preaching the Gospel,  to  a l l  peoples  (Can. 747 § 1.) ;  the 
teaching of  moral pr inciples , inc luding those regarding soc ial order  (Can. 747 
§2)  and the salvat ion of  souls, cons idered in the CCL as the supreme law of  the 
Cathol ic Church  (Can 1752) .  
Another d is tor t ion in tournaments emerges in cases in which a worker  
has a space where he can tr y to inf luence, in h is favor,  the opin ion of  h is  
super iors, wi th the a im of  obtain ing a better appraisal  or  when giv ing in to their  
whims or imposi t ions,  even though these at t i tudes do not contr ibute to the 
organizat ion in which they work  for ,  dimin ishing cooperat ion.   
However , f rom the moment in which measures to incent ivate cooperat ion  
and combat sabotage can be put into pract ice, d istort ion in Tournaments can be 
e l im inated.  One of  these measures is to s ignal ize that the workers who do not  
44 
 
work  as a team to promote the interests  of  the organizat ion,  wi l l  not be 
promoted.    
In the case of  re l igious organizat ions, cooperat ion is considered as a 
pr inc ip le of  ac t ion and of  conduct .  Cler ics  who adopt non -cooperat ive behaviors  
have remote chances of  promotion,  unless they change their  att i tude.  In th is  
way,  another advantage of  the appl icat ion of  Tournaments  in re l igious 
organizat ions is  that  the work  of  the c ler ics  is  re lat ive ly independent in what i t  
refers to the exerc ise of  their  funct ions
1 6
.   On the other  hand,  in the case of  the 
Cathol ic Church, c ler ics of  lower h ierarchical level are subjected to constant 
monitor ing by their  super iors and a l l  c ler ics are subordinated, di rec t ly or  
indirect ly,  to the supreme author i ty of  the Roman Pont i f f .   That is  a lso an  
advantageous aspect of  the appl icat ion of  Tournaments  to these cases, s ince 
re l ig ious organizat ions count on some ef f ic ient moni tor ing mechanisms and 
devious behavior are re lat ive ly easy to detect .   One of  these mechanisms is 
res id ing in the same place together wi th other pr iests and c ler ics, such as 
par ish pr iests and parochia l v icars (Can.  533 § 1, 550 § 1,2),  members of  the 
Society of  Aposto l ic  L ife (Canon 731 § 1, 740) and membe rs of  Rel ig ious 
Ins t i tutes (Can. 607 § 1, 665 § 1) .   Through th is mechanism of  communal 
res idence, the Ordinary super ior ,  can constant ly moni tor  the behavior  of  each 
one of  these c ler ics and rel ig ious men.    
 
Final  considerat ions  
 
 
Remunerat ion per product is  not a ru le among organizat ions to st imulate 
the ef for t  of  their  workers , and th is is  par t icu lar ly true for re l ig ious 
organizat ions, cons ider ing the intr ins ic d if f icul ty in measur ing and moni tor ing 
the performance of  their  c ler ics  (Zech, 2001,  p .331).   Therefore,  in th is  work , 
we cons ider promot ions as an incent ive remunerat ion mechanism, that is  to 
                                                     
1 6
 In  th is  case,  the product ion funct ion of  the c ler ics  of  the Cathol ic  Church would be  
addi t ive.   
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say, the Tournaments  Promot ion Model,  as an explanatory and p laus ib le 
theoret ica l f ramework for  the remunerat ion ru les of  the workers  in re l igious 
organizat ions.  Tournaments  are common ly used by re l ig ious organizat ions, 
even i f  they are not aware of  i t ,  in  order to st imulate their  workers, who act  in  
the scenar io of  an organizat ional internal market,  where asymmetr ica l 
informat ion and re lat ive ly high moni tor ing costs  are h ighl ighted,  an d where 
promot ions are the main form of  incentive.  
I f  the monitor ing costs are h igh, the Moral  Hazard  problem is  incurred 
into, where the product ef f ic iency gain, based upon the product -salary payment 
scheme, can be overcome by the re lat ive loss due to r i sks d iv is ion.  The 
remunerat ion of  the agents , based on the rank ing,  a l ters  the measurement  
costs , as wel l  as the nature of  the r isks run by the agents.  Tournaments seek 
to solve the moral  hazard problem, with in the internal  labor market of  the f irms,  
where there are posts  involv ing complex tasks, with intr ins ic moni tor ing and 
measur ing dif f icu lt ies . This is  the spec if ic  case of  rel ig ious organizat ions 
where, general ly speak ing, there are no external se lect ions or  contracts for  
their  appointments and funct ions;  merely an internal se lect ion or contract .  This  
is  one more spec if ic i t y of  the re l igious market.   
For the Tournament  to  be successfu l ,  i t  is  essent ia l that each par t ic ipant ,  
ind iv idual ly,  perceives he wi l l  have the necessary condi t ions to be the winn er,  
being suf f ic ient for  th is that he employs h is  maximum ef fort  throughout a l l  his 
career .  In this  way, the tournaments  are used to create a compet i t ive scheme 
within the organizat ion, wi th the object ive that the agents employ their  best 
abi l i t ies and st rategies to reach the best possible performance.   In what  refers  
to rel ig ious organizat ions, th is performance can be assessed in terms of  the 
number of  fa ithfu l converted and/or bapt ized, at tendance to div ine worship and 
re l ig ious services in general,  vo lume of  f inanc ial contr ibut ion, number of  
churches bui l t ,  etc .  
Observing the re lat ive performance of  the agents at the end of  the 
compet i t ion,  the s ize of  the increase, re lated to a specif ic  promot ion, can be 
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determined.  That  remunerat ion scheme possesses normat ive propr iet ies which 
are usefu l,  tak ing into account the incent ives that tournaments create, under  
certa in assumpt ions, a l lowing to deal wi th the moral  hazard  problem, where the 
pr ize for  the winner  is  d if fered in t ime but,  the ef for t  demanded must be 
performed continuous ly.  According to Ehremberg and Bognanno (1990, p.  
1308) th is makes the tournament model a target of  in terest for  academic 
research,  s ince i t  seems to descr ibe, in an appropr iate way,  the compensat ions 
received by agents who work  in d if ferent organizat ions.  For  W eiss and St ig l i tz 
(1983), one of  the advantages of  the tournament model is  that i t  a l lows to 
create, automatical ly,  an adaptable incent ive structure to the changes observed 
in the workplace. In the case of  the re l igious labo r p lace, th is,  general ly 
involves internal  aspects such as teaching,  indoctr inat ion and counsel ing of  the 
fai thfu l ,  m in is trat ion of  the Euchar ist ,  chr istenings and weddings;  and external  
ones, such as mass evangel izat ion, v is i t ing the s ick  in hospita ls,  v is i ts to 
orphanages and shelters, pr isons, etc .  
Promotion tournaments have as an a im to st imulate, wi th in the 
organizat ion and in a l l  the h ierarchical structure, the creat ion of  ef for t  incent ive 
mechanisms and for the better re lat ive performance of  i ts  wo rkers, through a 
c lassif icat ion cr i ter ia  (rank ing)  where a l l  re levant  informat ion must be  
contained.  The pay-off  of  an agent depends only of  h is c lass if icat ion. I f  any 
worker , indiv idual ly,  can be cer ta in that he is given and warranted a l l  the 
condit ions to reach the top of  the hierarchical structure of  the organizat ion he 
works for  (CEO) ,  then th is agent  should endeavor , wi th the f irm compromise, to 
reach that object ive.   The f inal i t y of  a promot ion tournament with in a re l ig ious 
organizat ion must  be,  therefore,  that  of  incent ivat ing i ts c ler ics  to make the 
maximum ef fort ,  avoid ing shirk ing behavior ,  in order  to,  through the means of  
assessment of  their  performance, in re lat ive terms, a l low for the choice of  the 
best candidates to be promoted to the ex ist i ng vacanc ies, main ly for  the top of  
the re l ig ious h ierarchy.   
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In the case of  the Roman Cathol ic Church,  for  ins tance,  the post of  the 
Roman Pont i f f  (Pope) , when i t  becomes vacant,  is  open, in theory,  to any 
cathol ic  (Can 1024) . In pract ice, however , due t o the tradit ion created in the 
last centur ies, the Roman Ponti f f  is  chosen only by those e lect ing Cardinals ,  
that  compose the Col lege of  Cardinals . To reach th is level ,  i t  is  required f rom 
the candidate to advance, step by step, wi th in the h ierarchical  st r ucture of  the 
Cathol ic Church and that he obta in excel lency in the performance of  h is  
at tr ibut ions.  According to the premises of  the Promot ion Tournament Theory,  
th is should certa in ly contr ibute to mot ivate each and every cathol ic c ler ic .   The 
object ive is that the c ler ics should employ, f rom the very beginning of  their  
career ,  in the re l ig ious organizat ion in which they chose to work  for ,  a l l  their  
ef for t ,  in the sense of  performing, in the best poss ib le way,  their  funct ions in 
each h ierarchical stage, avoid ing shirk ing behavior ,  to  be able, u lt imately,  to  
occupy the post of  Roman Pont i f f  in  the case the post  were vacant .    
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